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This paper deals with the problems of phylogenesis and ontogenesis of lan-
guage, departing from Niklas Luhmann’s general hypothesis of the co-evolution 
of psychic and social systems. Regarding phylogenesis, the focus in Luhmann’s 
theory was placed on the “pre-linguistic medium of communication” construct-
ed by gestures, which would have been the element that stimulated the evolu-
tion of language. This sort of communication allows for the emergence of a 
certain social order. Here, the problem was the impossibility of identifying this 
social order by one of the primary forms of societal differentiation. An attempt 
was made to interpret in which societal contexts pre-language “emerges”. In 
order to do this, the author resorted to Michael Halliday’s systemic-functional 
linguistics. Concerning ontogenesis, the attention was directed to the concepts 
of action and experience. The point of departure was Ilja Srubar’s criticism of 
Luhmann’s theory of language, according to which the acquisition of language 
can be thought of as a process of translating action schemes into linguistic 
ones. This implies a nativist vision of language discarded by Luhmann and also 
by Halliday. The latter indicated that it is impossible to talk about translating 
non-linguistic and pre-linguistic cognition schemes into linguistic form because 
there is no model of experience previous to the linguistic categories. In addi-
tion, an attempt was made to show that systemic-functional linguistics can be 
useful to fill the gap regarding the ontogenesis of language left by Luhmann’s 
systems theory.
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phylogenesis of language, the action/experience distinction, systemic-functional 
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1. Introduction
This paper deals with Luhmann’s interpretations of the phylogenesis and 
ontogenesis of language. Even if Luhmann did not treat the topic with as 
much profundity as he did others (such as communication, society, dou-
ble contingency, etc.), the concept of language takes up a central place in 
Luhmann’s systems theory as it is the element that “connects” conscious-
ness and communication. Despite its importance, only Srubar (2005) has 
considered this topic in his general assessment of Luhmann’s concept of 
language. We will discuss one of Srubar’s critiques regarding the rela-
tionship between action and language. In addition to Srubar, we can also 
mention Michael Urban’s (2009) study of the psyche, which discussed in 
depth Luhmann’s conceptualisations of the psychic system. Urban intro-
duces Alfred Lorenzer’s and Julia Kristeva’s ideas in order to account for 
the pre-linguistic and linguistic development of the psyche. Nevertheless, 
Urban does not make clear how he reconciles systems theory with these 
interpretations of language.
In order to assess Luhmann’s conceptualisations of the emergence of 
pre-linguistic communication (phylogenesis) and the relationship between 
action and language (ontogenesis), we will observe systems theory from the 
systemic-functional linguistic point of view. The aim is not to achieve con-
vergence between both theories but, instead, to identify some blind spots 
and weaknesses in Luhmann’s theorising. We find that systemic-functional 
linguistics are particularly appropriate to carry out this task, as Michael 
Halliday (1978, 2003) has devoted an important part of his work to the 
study of protolanguage in children and the passage into adult language. 
This detailed analysis has been used as a basis for a phylogenetic interpre-
tation of the emergence of language. In addition, these phylogenetic stud-
ies have been complemented with evidence from other disciplines, such as 
anthropology, neuroscience, psychology, biology, etc.
Departing from a brief exposition of Luhmann’s and Halliday’s con-
ceptualisations of language, this criticism will concentrate on two points. 
Firstly, attention will be focused on the emergence of language and its 
societal context. Related to this question of the origin of language, we will 
reintroduce the concepts of action and experience through Srubar’s criti-
cism in order to deal with the problem of the ontogenesis of language. We 
will leave for another paper the assessment of language as a medium for 
the structural coupling between psychic and social systems.
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2. The concept of language in systems theory and in 
systemic-functional linguistics
2.1. Language in Luhmann’s systems theory
Systems theory departs from the system/environment distinction (Luhmann, 
1995a). A system can survive if it can preserve its boundaries with the 
environment. Unlike machines and organisms, social systems, as psychic 
systems, utilise the medium of meaning as a substratum to develop their 
operations. Processing meaning implies that the system works by continual-
ly remodelling the difference between actuality and possibility. As a result, 
meaning is understood as the continuous actualisation of possibilities. In 
order for a social system with these traits to emerge, it needs to overcome 
the situation of double contingency. The simplest form of this event entails 
the encounter of two psychic systems (alter and ego). As each of them 
defines its behaviour by self-referential operations, both tend to presuppose 
the same regarding the other. This leads each to treat the other as an alter 
ego. In this relationship emerges a new order that cannot be reduced to 
either of the systems that produced it.
A social system reproduces itself through only one sort of operation: 
communication. In this analysis, communication is seen as the synthesis of 
three selections: utterance (Mitteilung), information and understanding (Ver-
stehen) (Luhmann, 1995a, 2012). Utterance enunciates information, while 
information indicates an event that selects states of a system. This means 
that information is not a simple message. Ultimately, understanding is not a 
psychic experience but the act of distinguishing and maintaining the differ-
ence between utterance and information. When ego can draw that distinc-
tion, there is communication. Beyond the unity of communication, there is 
the possibility to accept or reject communication, whose value lies in its 
capacity to connect communications. In order for communication to be-
come a process, single communication events must be ordered by themes. 
Nevertheless, communication also faces three improbabilities (Luhmann, 
1995a): the improbability of understanding, the improbability of reaching 
the addressee and the improbability of success such that the communica-
tion is accepted and followed. The solutions for these improbabilities are: 
language, the media of dissemination and symbolically generalised com-
munication media. In this analysis, language is interpreted as a medium, 
which increases the decipherability of communication beyond the sphere 
of perception.
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As language is a medium that "relates" social and psychic systems as 
well as one that intensifies understanding, it is necessary to introduce the 
concepts of interpenetration and structural coupling. The first indicates that 
interpenetrating systems enable each of the systems to introduce its own 
already-constituted complexity into the other.
It is possible to suppose that the weakness of the concept of interpen-
etration, partially accepted by Luhmann (2004), has brought Luhmann to 
look for a theoretical alternative that could link better with his conceptual 
assemblage. For this reason, Luhmann has resorted to another of Humberto 
Maturana’s categories (Maturana, 1982): structural coupling. With this con-
cept, Luhmann (1995b) expected to exclude every possible combination be-
tween the operations of both systems, trying to exclude an operational cou-
pling. This is expressed with the Maturanian formula, according to which 
structural coupling is orthogonal regarding autopoiesis.
Concerning social systems, these can only be structurally coupled to 
psychic systems,1 which implies that communication can only receive per-
manent irritations from consciousness.2 If these irritations become stable, it 
is possible that they will guide the development of structures in a certain 
direction. From another point of view, the structural coupling translates 
analogical relations into digital ones. In spite of this conceptual turn, Luh-
mann, in his book Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997, 2012, 2013), 
adds that it is possible to talk about interpenetration when the coupled 
systems co-evolve.
Language plays an essential role in this context, as it is the medium 
that allows the structural coupling (but not the interpenetration) between 
social and psychic systems. In his book Social Systems (1995a), Luhmann 
indicates that, on the one hand, language intensifies understanding beyond 
what is actually perceptible. On the other hand, the sociologist adds that 
language amplifies infinitely the repertoire of understandable communica-
tion, as practically every event can be treated as information. Finally, Luh-
1 For a reformulation of the concept of structural coupling between psychic and social sys-
tems, cf. Baraldi (1993). Baraldi recombines the concepts of interpenetration and structural 
coupling at the same time that he distinguishes between the structures of the psychic and 
social systems.
2 Because of the operational cloture of autopoietic systems, the environment cannot inter-
vene in the operativity of the system. This implies that the environment can only cause 
irritations or perturbations to the system. These irritations are internal constructions that 
are the result of the contrast between the events and the system’s structures.
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mann emphasises that language ensures the reflexivity of the system, which 
entails the possibility of self-steering.
As previous indicated, in Social Systems language is interpreted as 
a medium that solves one of the improbabilities of communication. Nev-
ertheless, Luhmann does not delve into the particularities. Years later, in 
Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997) and in an article entitled “Sign 
as Form” (1999), he proposes two different interpretations of language 
that are not completely compatible. In Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, 
Luhmann indicates that linguistic communication is a processing of mean-
ing in the phonic medium. As a result, the medial substratum of language 
will be meaning/sound. In this context, Luhmann defines meaning as that 
which “is not the sound but determines what sound is to be selected if this 
meaning and no other is to be spoken about”, while “the sound is not the 
meaning, but with this not-being, as it were, it determines what meaning 
is spoken about in each case” (2012: 128). This processing of meaning 
in the phonic medium produces the condensation of sounds into words. 
Naturally, in order for this process to take place, as Luhmann (2012, 2013) 
himself reveals, one needs grammar and – alluding to Noam Chomsky but 
rejecting the innatist connotations of the concept – deep structures. What 
Luhmann does not clarify is where such grammar and deep structures lie 
and how they operate in the process previously described. As each distinc-
tion implies distinguishing / indicating, and only psychic and social systems 
operate in the medium of meaning, the process due to which a meaning is 
distinguished and a sound is indicated cannot be something other than the 
result of a psychic or social operation. An additional problem is establish-
ing how grammar and deep structures work.
Consequently, words will be the loosely coupled elements of the 
medium of language. These words, in turn, will condense into phrases, 
which will be the forms of language according to the distinction phrases/
words. Therefore, phrases come to confirm and condense the meaning of 
each phrase, condemning to oblivion those that are not utilised for a long 
time. In spite of this, meaning/sound, just like phrases/words, are neither 
structures, nor elements, nor operations of any of the systems that process 
meaning. Simply, these two distinctions constitute the unity of the differ-
ence of the form of the medium of language.
On the other hand, Luhmann (1999) also integrates semiologic catego-
ries into his analysis, specifically the Saussurean concept of sign, conceived 
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as the distinction between signifier and signified (De Saussure, 1995). As 
forms, signs exist exclusively in the operations of a system that utilises 
them – and never in the environment. These signs have their own charac-
teristics, one of which is that they must be isolated. In this sense, they must 
be distinguishable and not confused, which makes it possible to use them 
repeatedly as discernible units. As a result, they can be remembered. In ad-
dition, signs must be redundant, providing a surplus of meaning, which al-
lows the anticipation of the next sign. Finally, following the father of semi-
ology, signs must be arbitrary, but not in the sense of being freely selected 
or independent of any structure or context. On the contrary, arbitrariness is 
present in the fact that the relationship between signifier and signified is 
unmotivated, and thus it has no parallel in “reality”. As a consequence, it 
does not imitate nature.
The main difference between the distinction between sound/meaning 
and signifier/signified is that the Saussurean signifier is not merely a sound 
but an acoustic image, which is a psychic trace (De Saussure, 1995). The 
sound that Luhmann (2012, 2013) references seems to be material sound 
(to use Ferdinand de Saussure’s words), which is completely independent 
of any psychic image. In this way, this medium of language can find its 
abode in a terrain independent of the psychic and social realms. On the 
contrary, the problem that Luhmann (2004) finds in the theory of sign is 
that a sign indicates an internal state of the speaker. Here, the two theories 
seem to be incompatible. Making an interpretative effort, it is possible to 
reconcile the meaning and the signified. Meaning remains a more abstract 
category, as the signified is only the concept. Nevertheless, a concept can 
be considered to be a particular condensation of meaning, and, as such, it 
would be a particular type of form in that medium. These inconsistencies 
in Luhmann’s approach to language show that it is still necessary to rethink 
language in the context of systems theory.
According to Luhmann, language ensures the regularity and continuity 
of the autopoiesis of society. This means that communication would have 
been improbable without the contribution of language. For systems theory, 
the questions regarding the ontogenesis and the phylogenesis of language 
can be answered by the concept of co-evolution between social and psychic 
systems (Luhmann, 1995a, 2012, 2013). This implies that the appearance 
and development of language find their contexts in the general evolution 
of society, but it also means that psychic systems acquire language in this 
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special relationship with society. As a result, this concept of co-evolution 
accounts for the phylogenetic and ontogenetic dimensions of language. 
Nevertheless, co-evolution is a very general category and provides merely 
a conceptual context within which to focus research.
2.2. The systemic-functional approach to language
Since systems theory does not provide definitions of the processes of on-
togenesis and phylogenesis of language, we resort to Halliday’s systemic-
functional linguistics. Halliday (1998, 2004) understands that phylogenetic 
time is the time of the evolution of language as a system and of the evolu-
tion of its particular subsystems. This evolution manifests itself, for exam-
ple, in the emergence of particular registers, such as scientific discourse. 
In contrast, ontogenetic time expresses the development of the individual 
speaker. This individual experience is, for Halliday (1998), one of growth 
and not of evolution, following the cycles of growth, maturation and decay. 
Halliday’s research focuses mainly on the ontogenesis of language, trying 
to interpret how children begin to exchange meanings, how they construe a 
semantic system that slowly approximates the language of adults and how, 
while they develop that system, they use it to make sense of their expe-
riences (Halliday, 2003). Departing from the findings on the ontogenetic 
dimension, Halliday and Matthiessen (1999) hypothesise that the history of 
the individual speaker recapitulates some of the evolutionary progression 
along epigenetic lines. As we will later see, Christian Matthiessen (2006) 
has tried to support this hypothesis with the limited information that we 
have about those remote periods of hominization.
Halliday (1978) interprets language as a system of choices organised in 
three strata: semantics, grammar (or lexico-grammar) and phonology. These 
strata constitute a net of options and elections, in which each level “real-
ises” the others so that the selections made at the lexico-grammatical level 
restrict the field of options of what one can choose at the semantic level. 
At the same time, language is structured to make three kinds of meanings: 
ideational, interpersonal and textual.3
According to Suzanne Eggins (2004), this theory understands that a 
text is any passage that forms a unified whole, and the property that per-
mits for a distinction between text and non-text is called texture. As a re-
sult, the texture is that element that holds the clauses of a text together to 
3 For a definition of these three kinds of meanings, see subsection 2.3.
Santiago Gabriel Calise: Rethinking Niklas Luhmann’s Theory..., Revija za sociologiju 45 (2015), 3: 223–248
230
give them unity. In addition, texture involves the interaction of coherence 
(the text’s relation to its extra-textual context) and cohesion (the way the 
elements within a text bind it together as a unifying whole).
The functional analysis suggests (Eggins, 2004) that each dimension 
of social context is related in predictable and systematic ways to each type 
of meaning. Thus, language is “naturally” related to the structures of so-
cial life. As a consequence of this, if genres are different ways of using 
language, it should be found that speakers make different lexico-grammat-
ical choices according to the different purposes that they would like to 
achieve. Consequently, the texts of different genres will reveal different 
lexico-grammatical choices.
2.3. The concepts of meaning in Luhmann’s and Halliday’s 
theories
As the concept of meaning will be relevant in the following sections, it is 
important to show the similarities and differences between Luhmann’s and 
Halliday’s conceptualisations. First of all, there is a problem with the trans-
lation of Sinn, which was rendered into English with “meaning”. Meaning 
is a better translation for Bedeutung. In fact, Halliday’s meaning is rendered 
into German as Bedeutung and not with Sinn. This is a first sign that the 
authors are referring to different ideas.
Luhmann understands meaning (at least in Social Systems) as a product 
of the co-evolution of psychic and social systems. For both systems, mean-
ing is the form of their complexity and self-reference, and it represents a 
surplus of references to other possibilities of experience and action.4 Mean-
ing is defined as a medium in which form is the distinction between actu-
ality and potentiality. This implies that actualised meaning is and remains 
possible, and possible meaning remains actualisable (Luhmann, 2012, 
2013). In Spencer-Brownian (1972) language, this means that this form 
provides for the re-entry of the distinction into that which it distinguishes. 
As a result, meaning contains a copy of itself on both sides of its form. The 
re-entry allows meaning to be a self-regenerating medium for the ongoing 
selection of particular forms.
In contrast, Halliday states that there are four types of systems (physi-
cal, biological, social and semiotic systems), and the system of meaning (or 
4 In Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997, 2012, 2013), Luhmann avoids the reference to 
experience, action and intentionality when he unfolds his concept of meaning.
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semantics) is one of the systems that constitutes the semiotic system. Even 
if the label “systemic” is part of the name of this theory, it is not evident 
what “system” means for Halliday. In a paper published in 1966 (Halliday, 
2005e), the English linguist says that the relation of system to paradigm is 
analogous to that of structure to syntagm.5 As a result, a system would be 
a representation of relations on the paradigmatic axis, and thus the gram-
matical description of a linguistic item involves a structural and a systemic 
component. This definition is clear and has evident points of contact with 
the linguistic tradition, but it only explains the meaning of “system” in a 
linguistic context. Halliday does not propose any general systems theory, 
as Luhmann does, that can explain what constitutes a physical, a biological 
and a social system. Halliday (1998) only says that physical systems are just 
physical systems. Biological systems are physical systems with the added 
component of “life”. Social systems are biological systems with the added 
component of “value”. Finally, semiotic systems are social systems with the 
added component of “meaning”. As a result, meaning is a social and psychic 
process, but it only emerges with the appearance of a semiotic system.
Returning to Luhmann (1995a), the possibility to experience or enact 
meaning is determined in operations of psychic or social systems. Meaning 
gives form to both psychic and social operations, as they are accomplished 
on the basis of meaning. As a result, meaning entails selection, as selection 
and operation are the same process. Meaning produces an excess of pos-
sibilities, but it compels the system to actualise only one. At the same time, 
through reference (Verweisung) to everything that is not actual, meaning 
allows one to indicate everything that is not actual.
In a similar vein, Halliday understands that meaning is the product of 
choice (2005a). For the English linguist (Halliday, 2005c), language consti-
tutes human experience, as grammar transforms experience into meaning. 
In addition, language constitutes social processes and the social order, as 
through meaning grammar brings about the process and the order. Experi-
ence is construed twice: semantically and lexico-grammatically (Halliday 
5 The concept of structure is also very vague in Halliday’s theorising. The linguist does 
not provide an abstract definition of structure as Luhmann does. Referring to the three 
components of meaning, he indicates (2005e) that to each component corresponds a type 
of structure. As a result, “experiential structures tend to be more elemental in character, 
interpersonal structures tend to be prosodic and textual structures tend to be culminative 
or periodic” (Halliday, 2005e: 209). However, this concrete description of each type of 
structure does not allow us to deduce a general concept.
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and Matthiessen, 1999). Both Halliday and Luhmann interpret meaning as 
a construction. The difference is that Halliday has a “humanist” vision, 
since the one that transforms experience into meaning is the human being 
who possesses the language; for Luhmann, both social and psychic systems 
operate in the medium of meaning, actualising continuously its possibilities. 
Whereas for Luhmann communication is in the foreground and language 
holds a marginal position, for Halliday language plays the central role.
The last point of comparison is the dimensions of meaning. Luhmann 
(1995a) identifies three meaning dimensions: the fact dimension, the tem-
poral dimension and the social dimension. The German sociologist indi-
cates that the fact dimension refers to all objects of meaningful intention 
(in psychic systems) and themes of meaningful communication (in social 
systems). This dimension distinguishes between something as yet indeter-
minate and something else as yet indeterminate. Regarding the temporal 
dimension, its primary distinction is that between before and after, which 
is extended into the past and the future. This means that this dimension 
becomes independent of that which is immediately experienced. The social 
dimension is connected with that which one accepts as an alter ego. This 
implies that this alter ego becomes relevant to all objects and all themes.
Halliday (2005b) also identifies three components of meaning, as men-
tioned in subsection 2.2. The ideational component interprets language as 
representation. Here, the semantic system becomes the expression of ex-
perience. The second component is the interpersonal, in which language is 
viewed as interaction. In this, the semantic system expresses the speaker’s 
intrusion into the speech event (i.e., one’s attitudes, evaluations and judg-
ments; one’s expectations and demands; the role that one is taking in the 
communication process and the role that one is assigning to the hearer). 
The textual component indicates that the speaker structures meaning as 
text, organising each element as a piece of information and relating it to 
that which has gone before.
This decomposition of meaning into dimensions or components shows 
some similarities: between the fact dimension and the ideational component 
and between the social dimension and the interpersonal component. Despite 
these similarities, the analysis carried out in this section expresses that the 
authors are referring to different phenomena, not just different interpreta-
tions of meaning. Luhmann’s concept of meaning is placed in a higher de-
gree of abstraction, as it precedes all the processes that Halliday describes.
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3. The origin of language: Luhmann’s hypothesis on the 
phylogenesis of language viewed through systemic-functional 
linguistics
3.1. Luhmann’s hypothesis regarding the pre-linguistic 
communication medium
As we have stated in the previous section, Luhmann does not provide any 
systematic explanation of the phylogenesis of language. However, he ex-
pressed his hypothesis about the emergence of language in a long paragraph 
in Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, which is quoted in the appendix. Ac-
cording to Luhmann, language ensures the regularity and continuity of the 
autopoiesis of society. This means that communication would have been 
very improbable without the contribution of language. For systems theory, 
the question regarding the ontogenesis and the phylogenesis of language 
can be answered by the concept of co-evolution between social and psychic 
systems. This implies that the appearance and development of language 
find their contexts in the general evolution of society. Nevertheless, co-
evolution is a very general category, which only provides a conceptual con-
text in which specific research regarding phylogenesis can find its place. 
However, it is not the answer to the problem.
The point of departure of Luhmann’s (2012, 2013) hypothesis referred 
to phylogenesis as a pre-linguistic communication medium. This medium 
could have profited from bodily movement, and/or it could have been a 
recursive sequence of gestures, which are signals, not signs. As Luhmann 
quotes George Herbert Mead, we can assume that the German sociolo-
gist refers here to Mead’s (1972) concept of “conversation of gestures”. 
This connotes non-conscious communication. According to Mead, language 
(constituted of significant symbols) and communication develop from this 
conversation of gestures, passing from non-significant to significant interac-
tion. From Luhmann’s text, we can deduce that this conversation of ges-
tures is episodic; it is constituted of signals, which are not signs (as they do 
not point to something else). Signs are species-specific and of very limited 
use, although they activate anticipatory reactions. This situation allows the 
emergence of “relatively complex social orders”. As there is a social or-
der, we can assume that there is communication. Luhmann (2012, 2013) 
identifies some conditions (reactive patterns of behaviour have to be reap-
plied to their own outcomes), limitations (the potential for form building 
was limited) and some traits (there were hierarchies and individual partner 
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preferences) of this social order. From this extremely brief description, we 
cannot be assured whether Luhmann is thinking of that which he calls a 
segmentary society or a preceding social order.
After this reference to that particular social order, Luhmann returns to 
pre-language. In this context, perception of perception and the perception 
of being perceived are the most important preparations for the evolution of 
language. Luhmann (2012, 2013) indicates something very important: In 
a context dominated by the conversation of gestures, metacommunication 
would not be possible. This is a crucial point, as this is a condition for 
the autopoietic closure of the social system. Finally, Luhmann concludes 
this paragraph by suggesting that gestures and sounds, as signs, played a 
role (we do not know which) in the take-off of the evolution of language. 
Luhmann seems to be convinced about the impossibility of metacommuni-
cation, but he does not dare to state as emphatically that autopoiesis would 
also be impossible. The survival of the social system seems to be tied to 
the survival of a particular group of human beings who take part in com-
munication and probably share some fundamental knowledge. This means 
that the survival of the social system is not indifferent to the generational 
change. Returning to the problem of the form of societal differentiation, 
if we suppose that in this primitive situation there are social systems ― 
because we admitted that there was communication ― but cannot assume 
that these systems are autopoietic, we can conclude that we are not facing 
a segmentary society. Nevertheless, this state of affairs cannot be thought 
of as isolated communicative episodes between solitary human beings. As 
we have previously seen, if there are hierarchies, then this pre-linguistic 
social situation must have developed some structures. As a result, we could 
be in a transitional moment, which will be overcome with the appearance 
of language, possibly the guarantor of metacommunication and autopoiesis. 
In addition, if we have noticed that this social order developed particular 
hierarchies and structures, it is quite difficult to believe that it relies so 
much on the survival of a particular generation of human beings and that 
this conversation of gestures is merely episodic.
In section 2, in referring to language as a medium, we have seen that 
Luhmann (2012, 2013) notes fleetingly that in order to condense sounds 
and meanings into words ready to be used, grammar and deep structures 
are necessary. In a very important footnote on this point (footnote num-
ber 36), Luhmann indicates that: “This is not to say that I agree with 
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Chomsky’s thesis that such structures must be innate, because the speed of 
language acquisition cannot otherwise be explained. […] What Chomsky 
seeks to explain in terms of innateness, I explain in terms of structural 
coupling and the consequent intensification of (origin-specific) irritations 
and irritation processing” (2012: 338). Luhmann rejects here the idea of a 
“universal grammar”. In order to account for the ease with which children 
acquire the grammar of their first language and the ability of adults to ef-
fortlessly use it, Chomsky hypothesises that “all human brains come with 
a built-in language organ that contains this language blueprint” (Deacon, 
1997: 35). Thus, Luhmann rejects innatism and explains the acquisition 
of grammar (and language in general) through structural coupling or, as 
we have already said, by means of the co-evolution of social and psychic 
systems. Some authors, such as Terrence Deacon (1997), would add to this 
the co-evolution of the brain and language. Nonetheless, Luhmann does not 
propound any particular hypothesis regarding the appearance or construc-
tion of grammar in this co-evolutionary process.
3.2. The systemic-functional hypothesis on the phylogenesis 
of language
Following Christian Matthiessen (2006), we can better illuminate these prob-
lems of the “evolution” and “emergence” of language. This author proposes a 
radical approach to this topic, departing from the hypothesis that ontogenesis 
recapitulates phylogenesis. This means that the ontogenetic phases of lan-
guage development constitute a model of phylogenesis. At this point, Mat-
thiessen indicates that even if the reader does not want to accept that highly 
controversial hypothesis, the adoption of the ontogenetic model represents a 
scheme of the way in which semiotic complexity can develop from a simple 
primary semiotic system. Moreover, this model points to no future goal; in-
stead, it shows how each stage of development is functional in its own right 
and how more complex semiotic patterns evolve out of existing ones.
Regarding the relationship between ontogenesis and phylogenesis, Mat-
thiessen (2006) also indicates that there is an important difference between 
them, as semiotic phylogenesis does not involve modelling and scaffolding 
by elder members. As a result, some processes that can be quite com-
pressed in ontogenesis could have been extended in phylogenesis.
Matthiessen departs from Halliday’s (2003) analysis of the acquisition 
of language in order to identify the three phases of the evolution of this 
Santiago Gabriel Calise: Rethinking Niklas Luhmann’s Theory..., Revija za sociologiju 45 (2015), 3: 223–248
236
process. The first one is protolanguage, which is bistratal (content/expres-
sion) and microfunctional (indicating that the function equals use and is di-
rectly tied to context). At the same time, based on anthropological research, 
Matthiessen locates this phase from before the emergence of the hominid 
line up to about the appearance of Homo habilis.6 In addition, Matthiessen 
states that protolanguage is very old and can be a semiotic potential shared 
with apes in the wild. Halliday (2006) suggests that protolanguage can be 
used to point, but one cannot use it to name things, refer to things, make 
generalisations or isolate and combine independent variables. In addition, it 
does not allow users to open a dialogue, construct a narrative or instigate 
any structured form of discourse. With protolanguage, one can reach the 
point of stringing signs together, even if this process is not quite common. 
In order to advance to a higher-order semiotic, it is necessary to introduce 
a stratum of grammar, which expands the meaning potential to an indefinite 
extent.
Phase II is a transitional tristratal model, which enjoys the emergence 
of lexico-grammar “as a new stratum within content and of a phonological 
system out of the vocal ‘postures’ of protolanguage” (Matthiessen, 2006: 
48). However, microfunctions turn into two macrofunctions: mathetic and 
pragmatic. One of the most important traits of phase II is the emergence 
of early types of narratives. From an anthropological point of view, this 
period is identified with the time of Homo erectus and archaic Homo sa-
piens. From a sociological perspective, this phase may coincide with the 
beginning of family-level group societies of approximately 25 members. 
Thus, the transition to local group societies seems to take place well into 
the next phase.
In phase III (Matthiessen, 2006), language becomes fully tristratal (se-
mantics, lexico-grammar, phonology) and is expanded later by graphology 
at the level of expression and by grammatical metaphor in the relation-
ship between semantics and lexico-grammar. However, language transitions 
from being macrofunctional to being metafunctional. From an anthropologi-
cal standpoint, the beginning of this phase took place towards the end of 
the archaic Homo sapiens, and the phase developed further during the time 
of modern Homo sapiens. Historically, this phase starts with the “Upper 
6 Matthiessen notes that “it seems plausible that some form of Phase I – protolanguage – is 
very old indeed, predating the evolution of the hominid line and thus extending back in 
time before the common ancestor” (Matthiessen 2006: 56).
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Palaeolithic revolution” and the emergence of the anatomically modern hu-
man and continues to our present time. From a sociological perspective, the 
first social formations were local groups of 100 to 500 members.
This systemic-functional perspective finds that the key motif in the 
evolution of language was the creation of meaning, suggesting that every 
evolutionary change expanded the meaning-making power. As Halliday 
says (2006), the meaning potential is something that has to be learnt and 
constructed, and grammar is the driving force because it has a special place 
as the source of energy for the semiotic process.
3.3. Reassessing Luhmann’s hypothesis on pre-linguistic 
communication from the standpoint of systemic-functional 
linguistics
In light of the previous discussion, we can return to Luhmann’s paragraph 
cited in the appendix. The sequence of recursive gestures that Luhmann 
mentions is most probably identifiable with Matthiessen’s phase II, as it is 
in that moment that language started to acquire the capacity for the forma-
tion of sequences with a semantic structure. In contrast, in phase I there 
was no possibility of dialogue. From the point of view of social differen-
tiation, Matthiessen relates this phase with the beginning of family-level 
group societies. In contrast, Luhmann signals the existence of relatively 
complex social orders characterised by hierarchies and individual partner 
preferences. In this instance, Luhmann is cognisant of not mentioning or-
ganisation through families, as this is a particular trait of segmentary so-
cieties. Therefore, one possibility would be that the scenario depicted by 
Luhmann represents the very beginning of a form of differentiation based 
on family before the consolidation of segmentary societies. From the view-
point of metacommunication, it would be difficult to metacommunicate with 
the transitional language of phase II. At that moment, language expresses 
pragmatic (“somebody to do something”) and mathetic functions (a learn-
ing function). In the examples provided by Halliday for these two types of 
macrofunctions (2003, 2006), we cannot find examples of metacommunica-
tion. Nevertheless, in phase II there is the possibility of dialogue, which 
implies the possibility of construing themes and, as a consequence, the 
formation of a rudimentary social memory. This can contradict Luhmann’s 
statement: “It remains to be seen whether, under these circumstances, we 
can already speak of autopoietic closure of a social system independent of 
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the course of life – for example, enduring beyond the death of whole gen-
erations” (2012: 124). If we suppose that with dialogue there can be for-
mation of themes and semantics, the autopoietic closure and the endurance 
through generations could be, if not guaranteed, at least very likely. Sum-
marising, the situation that Luhmann depicts cannot be directly identified 
with one of the phases presented by Matthiessen, but it is possible to place 
it in between phases I and II. In contrast, if we consider that Luhmann’s 
scenario represents phase I, autopoiesis becomes more improbable, as there 
is no possibility of dialogue and both the construction of themes and meta-
communication become more questionable. Nevertheless, in phase I we 
cannot assume that these gestures could construct sequences. Moreover, 
this social order cannot be qualified as “relatively complex”, as it would be 
one of the simplest ones in human (if we can talk about humans) history. 
In this sense, it is not possible to accept the presence of “hierarchies and 
individual partner preferences” (Luhmann, 2012: 123) as manifestations of 
some sort of social differentiation, because in segmentary societies there 
were no differences between members. Consequently, it is not possible to 
postulate that the form of societal differentiation prior to segmentary socie-
ties is more complex than segmentariness itself. In addition, we should also 
assume that this social order was not organised by families.
Regarding the problem of the phylogenetic evolution of language, there 
are some conflicting points between the systems’ theoretical and systemic-
functional approaches. As has been said before, Luhmann says that the 
most important preparation for the evolution of language is the perception 
of perception and the perception of being perceived, and he emphasises 
the role played by gestures and sounds. In contrast, systemic-functional 
linguistics draws the attention to grammar as the key element in evolution. 
It is not perception of perception or the use of gestures and sounds, but 
grammar that expands the limits of meaning. Concerning meaning, there is 
a distinct difference between these two theories. In the first line of the para-
graph quoted in the appendix, Luhmann says directly that a “pre-linguistic 
communication medium that did not yet constitute meaning can have lain 
only in the totality of the behavioral options of individuals in each other’s 
presence” (Luhmann, 2012: 123). This can be due to the fact that Luhmann 
follows Mead’s concept of “conversation of gestures”. On the contrary, 
Halliday and Matthiessen consider that all three phases constitute meaning, 
even if the meaning potential increases with evolution. However, if we 
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consider that this pre-language does not constitute meaning, this raises a 
new question about the “emergence” of meaning. From our previous analy-
ses, we cannot deduce that it is the “emergence” of language as the ele-
ment that endorses the “emergence” of meaning. In addition, if part of the 
discussion were about the definition of the social order that emerges out 
of this communication of gestures, there is no apparent reason to exclude 
this social order from the medium of meaning. The systemic-functional 
approach connects each species of the genus Homo to a form of language 
and, as a result, to meaning. We cannot envisage any consistent reason why 
Luhmann considered that the pre-linguistic medium could not constitute 
meaning, leaving outside the realm of meaning some sort of social order 
and pre-linguistic communication. In conclusion, we think that it is more 
coherent for systems theory to assume that the pre-linguistic communica-
tion medium constitutes meaning.
4. Action and experience: the problem of the ontogenesis of 
language
4.1. A nativist approach to the ontogenesis of language: 
Srubar’s criticism of Luhmann’s approach to language
The previous section dealt with the problem of the phylogenesis of lan-
guage. In this section, we will turn our focus to ontogenesis. As we have 
already seen, the common point of departure for both these concepts is 
structural coupling. In the case of ontogenesis, Luhmann did not provide 
any particular hypothesis. This is one of the focuses of Srubar’s (2005) 
criticism because, according to him, there are series of cognitive patterns 
that are ontogenetic and adhere to the analysis of lifeworld and that by no 
means follow a primarily linguistic form. These patterns do not stem from 
acts of perception as Luhmann (like Edmund Husserl) – in the opinion of 
Srubar (2005) – is disposed to accept, but they are coined by corporeality 
and action as interaction with things and others. As a result, the acquisition 
of language can be thought of as a process of translation of action schemes 
into linguistic ones. In this sense, language can be seen as a meaning sys-
tem that projects phylogenetic structures of action, which are then adopted 
ontogenetically in contexts of action.
To hold these arguments, Srubar quotes the results of some research, 
departing from George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s analysis of the meta-
phor, which implies the translation of action schemes into linguistic forms. 
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Citing the work of Jeff Greenberg among others, he indicates how language 
can express quantities, objects, acts or location in space and time through 
nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs and other constructions. Referencing cre-
ole language studies, Srubar stresses the presence of minimal grammatical 
structures that every language must have. These structural elements belong 
to linguistic forms near action. They are necessary to describe a situation 
of action, and they represent the temporal (verb tense), spatial-material (lo-
cal prepositions, plural, quantities) and social (personal, reflexive, relative 
pronouns) dimensions of the field of action. In contrast to Luhmann and 
to systemic-functional linguistics, Srubar relies on nativist conceptions of 
language.
4.2. The systemic-functional explanation of the ontogenesis of 
language
Analysing the development of language in early childhood, Halliday (2003) 
finds a connection between the capacity of the child to move and experi-
ence and the language s/he employs. As a result, Halliday discovers that 
as the child learns to crawl, s/he can examine his/her environment obtain-
ing a three-dimensional perspective. At the same time, the signs become 
organised in the sign system that we have viewed as protolanguage. Like-
wise, the final path to adult language starts when the child begins to walk, 
which is also the last phase in the dimensioning of the child’s perception 
of the environment (Halliday, 2006). Most importantly, in adult language, 
grammar sets up a theory of experience, as grammar is the mechanism 
that transforms human experience into meaning, construing a universe of 
things and relationships and imposing categories on psychic perceptions of 
phenomena (Halliday, 1998). In the most general terms, grammar construes 
experience as process in the form of a clause.
Discussing the ineffability of grammatical categories, Halliday (2005d) 
indicates that there is no exact paraphrase of grammatical categories (e.g., 
subject, actor, theme, etc.), because they do not correspond to a language-
independent clustering of phenomena in our experience. They would be 
glossable only if language were a purely passive partner that only copies 
a reality. Nevertheless, language creates reality, and there is no model of 
experience prior to the linguistic categories, which model it. As a result, it 
is not possible to define these grammatical categories by relating them to 
some pre-existing model of experience, as Srubar seems to suggest.
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In this sense, we can doubt that there is a translation of non- and 
pre-linguistic cognition schemes in linguistic form, as Srubar indicates, 
because there is no model of experience before the linguistic categories. 
In addition, grammar does not represent action through its different dimen-
sions, because there is no model to copy. In this instance, the category 
of language also involves that of protolanguage, so there is no room to 
consider human experience prior to any of the three stages of language 
descripted in section 3. In contrast, if we adopt a nativist viewpoint, most 
of the linguistic categories are not construed phylogenetically and ontoge-
netically, but they are innate structures of the human brain. As a result, 
language would not be an active but a passive participant in the semogenic 
process.
4.3. The problem of action in Luhmann’s theory and its 
relation to the ontogenesis of language
Returning to Luhmann’s systems theory, until now we have talked about 
action and experience (Erleben). This pair of concepts is interpreted in sys-
tems theory (Luhmann, 2012, 2013) as two possibilities of attribution for 
(human) behaviour.7 This distinction departs from the distinction in com-
munication between information and utterance. Thus, when the accent is 
placed on information, the system interprets this process as experience (an 
attribution to the environment), while when the accent is placed on utter-
ance, we have action (an attribution to the system itself). Therefore, accord-
ing to this theory, action and experience are only attributions of behaviour 
and do not correspond to the operations of any system. Now, the ques-
tion becomes: What is behaviour? Luhmann finds the answer in Maturana 
(Luhmann, 2012: 410). As maintained by the Chilean biologist (Maturana, 
1982), an observer looks at an organism or living being as a unity that in-
teracts with its environment. S/he only sees the organism’s changes in posi-
tion or form in the environment as reactions to the perturbations that have 
occurred in that environment or as a result of the organism’s own internal 
dynamics. The organism’s changes in form and position relative to its en-
vironment constitute its behaviour. Nevertheless, behaviour does not belong 
to the organism as a trait of some or all of its changes of state. Behaviour 
7 In a text from 1978, Luhmann (1981) talks about human behaviour, but the adjective “hu-
man” will be erased from Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. In that text, Luhmann also 
indicates that both experience and action are cases of conditioned bodily and sequential 
performances. Another common feature is that both are intentional processes.
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is only the relationship between an organism and the environment in which 
an observer distinguishes and observes it. As a result, a system that is part 
of the organism (Maturana here talks about the case of the nervous sys-
tem) does not produce any behaviour; it only takes part in the dynamics of 
change in the organism. This means that behaviour is the construction of 
the observer, who cannot observe the organism’s internal changes of state. 
Consequently, s/he names those changes in position and form (the only 
events that s/he can register) “behaviour of organism X”. Therefore, as a 
mere construction of an observer, behaviour does not correspond exactly to 
any operation of a system. It would correspond, rather, to the result of the 
operativity of a series of systems that are structurally coupled.
Recapitulating, action and experience are attributions of behaviour, 
which, in turn, is constructed by an observer. Accordingly, action and ex-
perience are the names given to the observable results of the structurally 
coupled operativity of social, psychic and living systems. What we cannot 
do here is try to look for the operative correspondence to action or experi-
ence, as these are just the results of a process of observation that has no 
access to the operativity of the systems.
One focus of Srubar’s (2005) critiques is action. He understands it 
to be a third dimension of the lifeworld in addition to consciousness and 
communication. Srubar (2009)8 coined the concept of the action-thought-
language connection (HDS-Zusammenhang), as these represent three mo-
ments of the human approach to the world (Weltzugang) and are, there-
fore, associated with each other. In addition, following Alfred Schütz, he 
understands action as Wirken, or interaction with objects and with others, 
to which the primary structures of experience of the approach to the world 
trace back. In this sense, Wirken and its results are associated (as experi-
ence) with intentional, conscious acts.
As we have seen, action is not completely ignored by Luhmann. It 
is true that with Luhmann’s approach, action loses its ontological ground, 
and it cannot be equated to consciousness and communication, as Srubar 
suggests. On the other hand, Luhmann does not deny that action and ex-
perience are intentional processes. The main problem here is that Srubar 
insists on considering action to be a moment in the human approach to the 
world, strongly associating it to consciousness. Even if Luhmann talked 
8 See chapter: “Handeln, Denken, Sprechen. Der Zusammenhang ihrer Form als genetisch-
er Mechanismus der Lebenswelt”.
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previously about human behaviour, the attribute “human” refers here not 
only to consciousness, but also to bodily performances, which means that 
living systems (not to mention social systems) are also involved in the 
concept of behaviour.
If we put these “ontological” discussions aside, Srubar’s main point 
on ontogenesis and phylogenesis of language is the pre-eminence of action 
and the translation of action schemes into linguistic ones. This is not neces-
sarily in contradiction with Luhmann’s approach. Luhmann did not accept 
the nativist perspective, which Srubar is ready to incorporate. Introducing 
the systemic-functional approach, we have tried to reject both of Srubar’s 
hypotheses indicated in subsection 4.2.
Regarding the ontogenesis of language, our hypothesis is that sys-
temic-functional linguistics can be useful to fill the gap left by systems 
theory. A delicate issue here is the relationship between grammar and 
experience that Halliday hypothesised. As previously mentioned, Halli-
day states that grammar construes experience as process in the form of a 
clause. This is in accordance with Luhmann and Maturana’s interpretation 
of behaviour (and experience as an attribution of behaviour) as the con-
struction of an observer. Thus, this can strengthen Luhmann’s argument 
that action and experience are attributions of behaviour. In this process of 
attribution, which is a communicative process, the observer transforms a 
series of observations concerning some changes in position or form of a 
system (or of a conglomerate of systems as in the human body) into an 
utterance (linguistically constructed), which indicates that the reason for 
these changes are either in the environment (experience) or in the system 
(action).
5. Conclusions
Systems theory approaches the problems of ontogenesis and phylogenesis 
of language through the concepts of structural coupling and co-evolution 
between social and psychic systems. With respect to phylogenesis, we have 
seen that Luhmann departs from a scenario dominated by a pre-linguistic 
communication medium that does not constitute meaning. This sort of com-
munication, based in sequences of recursive gestures, allows the emergence 
of a certain social order. One problem is the impossibility of identifying 
this social order by one of the primary forms of societal differentiation, 
because this social order is prior to all forms of societal differentiation.
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On the other hand, Luhmann detects in this emerging social order the 
presence of sequences of recursive gestures. As Matthiessen indicates, the 
possibility of dialogue is a property of a transitional language, which ap-
pears in the context of a societal structuration organised around families. 
Another condition that Luhmann introduces in this situation is the impos-
sibility of metacommunication, which is a condition for the autopoietic 
closure of social systems. Even accepting the impossibility of metacom-
munication, the existence of dialogue could have allowed the construction 
of themes and, as a consequence, the formation of a rudimentary social 
memory. In this way, the survival of the communicative system can be 
ensured. An additional point of controversy is meaning. If we consider that 
this pre-language does not constitute meaning, this raises a new question 
about the “emergence” of meaning. In addition, there is no apparent reason 
to exclude the social order based on pre-linguistic communication from the 
medium of meaning.
Regarding ontogenesis, the point of departure of our analysis was Sru-
bar’s criticism of Luhmann’s interpretation of language, according to which 
the acquisition of language can be thought of as a process of translation of 
action schemes into linguistic ones. In contrast to this, systemic-functional 
linguistics denies the possibility of a translation of non- and pre-linguistic 
cognition schemes into linguistic form because there is no model of expe-
rience previous to the linguistic categories. In addition, grammar does not 
represent action through its different dimensions.
Our position here is that systemic-functional linguistics can be useful 
to fill the gap regarding the ontogenesis of language left by systems theory. 
Halliday states that grammar construes experience as process in the form 
of a clause, which is in accordance with Luhmann and Maturana’s inter-
pretation of behaviour as the construction of an observer. As a result, this 
point can strengthen Luhmann’s interpretation of action and experience as 
attributions of behaviour. Through this communicative process of attribu-
tion, the observer transforms his/her operations of observation related to 
the changes that another system undergoes into linguistically construed ut-
terances. When the observer understands that the cause of these changes is 
located in the environment, the system “experiences” these changes, while 
when the cause is identified with the system, it is the system itself that 
produces the changes (action).
 Santiago Gabriel Calise: Rethinking Niklas Luhmann’s Theory..., Revija za sociologiju 45 (2015), 3: 223–248
 245
REFERENCES
Baraldi, Claudio (1993). “Structural Coupling: Simultaneity and Difference be-
tween Communication and Thought”, Communication Theory, 3 (2): 112–129. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1993.tb00061.x
De Saussure, Ferdinand (1995). Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Éditions 
Payot & Rivages.
Deacon, Terrence (1997). The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language 
and the Brain. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.
Eggins, Suzanne (2004). An Introduction to Systemic Functional Linguistics. New 
York: Continuum.
Halliday, Michael (1978). Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation 
of Language and Meaning. Baltimore: University Park Press.
Halliday, Michael (1998). “Things and Relations: Regrammaticising Experience 
as Technical Knowledge”, in: James R. Martin and Robert Veel (eds). Reading 
Science: Critical and Functional Perspectives on Discourses of Science. Lon-
don and New York: Routledge, pp. 185–235.
Halliday, Michael (2003). The Language of Early Childhood. London and New 
York: Continuum.
Halliday, Michael (2004). “Things and Relations: Regrammaticizing Experience as 
Technical Knowledge”, in: Jonathan J. Webster (ed.). The Language of Science 
– M.A.K. Halliday. London and New York: Continuum, pp. 49–101.
Halliday, Michael (2005a). “Grammar and Daily Life: Concurrence and Comple-
mentarity”, in: Jonathan J. Webster (ed.). On Grammar – M.A.K. Halliday. 
London and New York: Continuum, pp. 369–383.
Halliday, Michael (2005b). “Modes of Meaning and Modes of Expression: Types 
of Grammatical Structure and Their Determination by Different Semantic 
Functions”, in: Jonathan J. Webster (ed.). On Grammar – M.A.K. Halliday. 
London and New York: Continuum, pp. 196–218.
Halliday, Michael (2005c). “On Grammar and Grammatics”, in: Jonathan J. Web-
ster (ed.). On Grammar – M.A.K. Halliday. London and New York: Continu-
um, pp. 384–418.
Halliday, Michael (2005d). “On the Ineffability of Grammatical Categories”, in: 
Jonathan J. Webster (ed.). On Grammar – M.A.K. Halliday. London and New 
York: Continuum, pp. 291–322.
Halliday, Michael (2005e). “Some Notes on ‘Deep’ Grammar”, in: Jonathan J. 
Webster (ed.). On Grammar – M.A.K. Halliday. London and New York: Con-
tinuum, pp. 106–117.
Halliday, Michael (2006). “On Grammar as the Driving Force from Primary to 
Higher-Order Consciousness”, in: Geoff Williams and Annabelle Lukin (eds). 
The Development of Language: Functional Perspectives on Species and Indi-
viduals. London and New York: Continuum, pp. 15–44.
Halliday, M. A. K. and Matthiessen, Christian M. I. M. (1999). Construing Expe-
rience Through Meaning: A Language-based Approach to Cognition. London 
and New York: Continuum.
Santiago Gabriel Calise: Rethinking Niklas Luhmann’s Theory..., Revija za sociologiju 45 (2015), 3: 223–248
246
Luhmann, Niklas (1981). Soziologische Aufklärung 3: Soziales System, Gese-
llschaft, Organisation. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Luhmann, Niklas (1995a). Social Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Luhmann, Niklas (1995b). Soziologische Aufklärung 6: Die Soziologie und der 
Mensch. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Luhmann, Niklas (1997). Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (2 Bd.). Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Luhmann, Niklas (1999). “Sign as Form”, in: Dirk Baecker (ed.). Problems of 
Form. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 46–63.
Luhmann, Niklas (2004). Einführung in die Systemtheorie. Heidelberg: Carl-Auer-
Systeme Verlag.
Luhmann, Niklas (2012). Theory of Society, Voume 1. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Luhmann, Niklas (2013). Theory of Society, Voume 2. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Matthiessen, Christian (2006). “The Evolution of Language: A Systemic Func-
tional Exploration of Phylogenetic Phases”, in: Geoff Williams and Annabelle 
Lukin (eds). The Development of Language: Functional Perspectives on Spe-
cies and Individuals. London and New York: Continuum, pp. 45–90.
Maturana, Humberto (1982). “Reflexiones: Aprendizaje o Deriva Ontogénica”, Ar-
chivos de Biología Y Medicina Experimentales, 15: 261–271.
Mead, George H. (1972). Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social 
Behaviorist. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Spencer-Brown, George (1972). Laws of Form. New York: The Julian Press.
Srubar, Ilja (2005). “Sprache und strukturelle Kopplung. Das Problem der Sprache 
in Luhmanns Theorie”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsycholo-
gie, 57 (4): 599–623. doi: 10.1007/s11577-005-0217-2
Srubar, Ilja (2009). Kultur und Semantik. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
Urban, Michael (2009). Form, System und Psyche. Zur Funktion von psychischem 
System und struktureller Kopplung in der Systemtheorie. Wiesbaden: VS Ver-
lag.
APPENDIX – Luhmann’s fragment on pre-linguistic 
communication
A pre-linguistic communication medium that did not yet constitute mea-
ning can have lain only in the totality of the behavioral options of indi-
viduals in each other’s presence. Movement in space will have played a 
considerable role. Following George Herbert Mead, we could also speak 
of a recursive sequence of gestures, in which not the single act but recur-
sivity (connection with what has preceded) prompts emergent effects. In 
such episodic contexts, we also find species-specific signals, which are, 
however, of very limited use. Signals are not yet signs, do not yet point 
to something else; they are only a factor activating “anticipatory reactions” 
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owing to typical, repeated complexes of present and future events, which 
are, however, not recognized as complexes. Such conditions can enable 
the morphogenesis of relatively complex social orders if reactive patterns 
of behavior are reapplied to their own outcomes. Participants do not need 
to be able to recognize the structures that consequently emerge and to 
react to them. The potential for form building must therefore have been 
correspondingly limited, but apparently sufficient to establish hierarchies 
and individual partner preferences. In the pre-linguistic field, indeed, even 
in relations between humans and animals, we find what is probably the 
most important preparation for the evolution of language: the perception 
of perception and, in particular, the perception of being perceived. Even 
in developed societies, even today, these are still indispensable forms of 
sociality, especially in relations between the sexes. At this level, sociality 
uses the complexity and focusability of perception and generates a pre-
sent—almost without a future. Even if we can assume this as, so to speak, 
a pre-prehistorical given, and accordingly that life in society adapted to 
this possibility, this social state of affairs would have allowed of no me-
tacommunication, no communication relating to communication; no, for 
example, confirmation of the receipt of an utterance, no repetition of the 
same utterance, no development of sequential, “punctuated” complexity 
in which communication presupposes that it has already operated succe-
ssfully with other content. It remains to be seen whether, under these cir-
cumstances, we can already speak of autopoietic closure of a social system 
independent of the course of life—for example, enduring beyond the death 
of whole generations—and whether and to what extent we can already 
speak of “language” in Humberto Maturana’s sense, of coordinating the 
coordination of living beings’ behavior in their individual existences. In 
any case, language in the usual meaning of the term with its clear prefe-
rence for acoustic media and the optical media deriving from them is a 
singular historical construction of evolution based on a stringent selection 
of resources. However, this is not the place to launch into a study of the 
evolution of language; I merely assume that, as in all evolution of auto-
poietic systems, a sort of auxiliary construction made takeoff possible. The 
use of gestures and sounds as signs presumably played a role. (Luhmann, 
2012: 123–124)
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U radu se obrađuju problemi filogeneze i ontogeneze jezika odmicanjem od 
opće hipoteze Niklasa Luhmanna o suevoluciji psihičkih i društvenih sustava. 
U pogledu filogeneze jezika, naglasak je u Luhmannovoj teoriji smješten na 
»predjezični medij komunikacije« sačinjen od gesta, koji je mogao biti temelj 
poticanja evolucije jezika. Ta vrsta komunikacije omogućuje pojavu određenoga 
društvenog poretka. Problem je bio u nemogućnosti identificiranja toga društve-
nog poretka jednim od primarnih oblika socijetalne diferencijacije. Autor ovog 
rada nastojao je protumačiti u kojim se socijetalnim kontekstima »pojavljuje« 
predjezik. U tu se svrhu oslonio na sistemsko-funkcionalnu lingvistiku Michae-
la Hallidaya. U pogledu ontogeneze jezika, pozornost je usmjerena na koncepte 
djelovanja i iskustva. Kao polazna točka za to poslužila je kritika Ilje Srubara 
upućena Luhmannovoj teoriji jezika, prema kojoj se na stjecanje jezika može 
gledati kao na proces prevođenja shema djelovanja u jezične sheme. To uključuje 
nativističko viđenje jezika koje su odbacili i Luhmann i Halliday, od kojih je 
potonji sugerirao kako je nemoguće govoriti o prevođenju nejezičnih i predjezič-
nih spoznajnih shema u jezični oblik, jer ne postoji model iskustva koji prethodi 
jezičnim kategorijama. Autor je i ovdje nastojao pokazati da sistemsko-funkcio-
nalna lingvistika može biti korisna u popunjavanju praznina koje je u tumačenju 
ontogeneze jezike za sobom ostavila Luhmannova sistemska teorija.
Ključne riječi: jezik u sistemskoj teoriji, Luhmann, ontogeneza jezika, filogeneza 
jezika, distinkcija djelovanja i iskustva, sistemsko-funkcionalna lingvistika
